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I.  INTRODUCTION
In May 1976, with merely $120,000 and a few metal chairs left behind
from a prior tenant, Kolberg Kravis Roberts & Co. (KKR) opened its
doors.  Though few people outside Wall Street circles knew of this start-up1
1
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2. Id. at xiv–xv.
3. Id. at xiv.
4. Id. at xx.
5. As of February 2007 the RJR Nabisco deal was still the third largest private equity deal. See
Private Equity Power List: Top Ten Deals, CNNMONEY.COM, Feb. 23, 2007, http://money.cnn.com/
2007/02/16/magazines/fortune/top10.fortune/index.htm (listing the most expensive private equity deals
of all time).
6. ANDERS, supra note 1, at xx.
7. This is the largest private equity deal as of April 2008. KKR, TPG-Led Consortium to
Acquire TXU, ALTASSETS, Feb. 26, 2007, http://www.altassets.com/news/arc/2007/nz10351.php.
8. Id.
9. Id. 
10. News Release, TXU Corp., TXU to Set New Direction as Private Company (Feb. 26,
2007), available at http://www.txucorp.com/media/newsrel/detail.aspx?prid=1020.
11. See supra note 5; see also infra Part III.A for a thorough description of private equity.
Briefly explained, “[p]rivate-equity firms solicit money from wealthy individuals and institutions
such as pension funds and then buy companies—private firms or public ones that want to go
private. They often use debt to help finance the purchases. They seek to fix operations and cut costs
and then make a return by selling the companies or taking them public, usually a few years later.”
Rick Rothacker, Private-Equity Firms Grow, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Nov. 3, 2006, at 1D. As an
aside, insider trading allegations arose with the TXU deal and at least one banker was
convicted in a New York court. See Michael J. DeLa Merced, Former Credit Suisse Banker
Convicted of Insider Trading by U.S. Court, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Feb. 5, 2008,
http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/02/05/business/05insider.php.
12. Private equity has become a very important part of the economy because it has raised a
company, by the 1980s its reputation as a takeover machine brought it
notoriety.  One can only imagine what went on behind closed doors, but2
whatever happened, it worked. By 1989, KKR had become the largest
client of accounting giant Deloitte & Touche, with General Motors
following as a close second.  The “Age of Leverage” peaked in 1990 when3
KKR took over RJR Nabisco.  Until 2006, this takeover was the largest in4
history and is still considered one of the largest ever.  The deal almost5
ruined KKR,  yet KKR managed to acquire many other companies in the6
ensuing years.
In late February 2007, KKR and other private equity firms announced
another record-breaking deal.  An investor group led by KKR and Texas7
Pacific Group (TPG) purchased TXU Corporation, a Texas-based energy
company, for an unprecedented $45 billion.  GS Capital Partners, Lehman8
Brothers, Citigroup, and Morgan Stanley became equity partners at
closing.9
An official statement explained that the new owners planned to have
stronger environmental and climate stewardship policies, to invest in
alternative energy, and to focus on the electric consumer market by
delivering both price cuts and protection.  Although a deal of this volume10
may seem extraordinary, it is only one of the many mega-deals in the
realm of private equity,  which has become a vital engine for investment11
in our economy.12
2
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tremendous amount of money, which allows private equity to do things that it could not do before.
Ken MacFadyen, 2007: A Look Back Provides a 2007 Roadmap for the Private Equity and Private
Placement Markets, INVESTMENT DEALERS’ DIG., Dec. 18, 2006, at 12, 14 (citing Mark Opel,
Principal, American Capital Partners). MacFadyen stated that “2006 will be remembered as the year
private equity came out of its shell.” Id. at 12; see also Kit R. Roane, The New Face of Capitalism,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 4, 2006, at 48, 48, 51 (explaining that club deals accounted for
$414 billion in buyouts from December 2005 to December 2006 and listing some of the biggest
brands that have now gone private including, “Clear Channel Communications, Cablevision,
Reader’s Digest, Dunkin’ Donuts, SunGard Data Systems, Freescale Semiconductor, Toys “R” Us,
Neiman Marcus, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, and hospital giant HCA, to note just a few”). 
13. Investor Words, Private Equity Definition, http://www.investorwords.com/3853/private_
equity.html (last visited May 13, 2008). 
14. Arleen Jacobius, Club Deal Probe Could Be Good News for Investors, PENSIONS &
INVESTMENTS, Oct. 16, 2006, at 3.
15. Id.
16. Tom Bawden, Buyout Firms in U.S. Cartel Inquiry, TIMES (London), Oct. 11, 2006, at
44. The DOJ Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) both have public
authority to enforce antitrust laws. The DOJ has jurisdiction pursuant to the Sherman Act and the
FTC can exercise additional authority pursuant to the Federal Trade Commission Act. Although
they have concurrent jurisdiction over some aspects of antitrust law, the DOJ has exclusive
jurisdiction over criminal matters. Private civil enforcement can also be sought by those suffering
antitrust injury, which may be difficult to prove. E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & JEFFREY L. HARRISON,
UNDERSTANDING ANTITRUST AND ITS ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS § 3.01, at 45 (4th ed. 2003). For
information on private civil actions against private equity firms, see generally David B. Caruso,
Investors Sue Private Equity Firms, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 15, 2006, available at
http://www.whafh.com/modules/press_release/?action=view&id=60. Caruso’s article discusses a
lawsuit filed against thirteen companies that engaged in private equity club deals. Id.; see also
Murphy v. Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co., No. 1:06-cv-13210 (S.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 15, 2006).
17. Bawden, supra note 16. The DOJ could be focusing on agreements between particular
bidders. Joint bids may be difficult to attack for efficiency reasons. Red flags would be agreements
to pull out of a bid, rewards for pulling out of bids, or rotating bids between deals. The DOJ would
want to look at how deals go together by sequence. Questions that should be asked are those such
as the circumstances of the particular deal, who is participating, and how the participants are
Generally, private equity is any equity investment that is not freely
tradable on public stock markets.  A trend contributing to the success of13
private equity is a strategy known as “clubbing.” Clubbing occurs when at
least two buyout firms join forces to purchase a company.  Buyout firms14
cite many reasons for clubbing, such as spreading the risk of a single deal
or amassing sufficient capital to acquire a huge corporate target.  But15
clubbing can carry negative consequences as well, especially if companies
use the practice to inhibit competition. This concern apparently worried
the Department of Justice (DOJ), which in October 2006 launched an
inquiry into the potentially anticompetitive behavior of private equity
firms—an inquiry that could unearth antitrust violations.16
The DOJ is examining the possibility of collusion among private equity
firms and is trying to discover attempts by clubs to reduce purchase
prices.  The inquiry started with a two-page letter sent to several of the17
3
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chosen. Dan Slater, Club Deals: Collusion or Illusion?, THEDEAL.COM, Nov. 10, 2006,
http://www.thedeal.com (available by subscription). 
18. Letters seeking information such as bidder names and price changes were sent to KKR,
Silver Lake Partners, The Carlyle Group, and Clayton, Dubilier & Rice. Dennis K. Berman &
Henny Sender, Private-Equity Firms Face Anticompetitive Probe; U.S.’s Informal Inquiries Have
Gone to Major Players Such as KKR, Silver Lake, WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 2006, at A3; see also KKR
& Co. L.P., Registration Statement (Form S-1A), at 38 (Nov. 13, 2007). This Note discusses the
TXU deal merely as an example of the clubbing practice—the acquisition was separately approved
and not under any investigation. See Elizabeth Souder, Buyout Gets Final OK from Nuclear
Regulators; Buyers Now Must Finish Getting the Financing in Place for the Deal, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Sept. 12, 2007, at 4D (explaining that TXU obtained the final approval that was
required for the deal to close).
19. Tom Allchorne, U.S. Department of Justice Launches PE Probe, EUR. VENTURE CAP. J.,
Nov. 2006, at 48, 49 (estimating that it could take up to three years before the inquiry concludes);
see also M. Cohn, DOJ Probes Private Equity Firms, RED HERRING, Oct. 10, 2006,
http://www.redherring.com/Home/19112 (noting that because these parties are sophisticated and
will not engage in facially illegal activities, it will be difficult to prove anything is wrong).
20. Richard L. Reinish & Ronan P. O’Brien, Private Equity and Antitrust Law: Primer in the
Face of the DOJ’s Investigation of Possible Anticompetitive Behavior, MGMT. ALERT (Seyfarth &
Shaw LLP), Oct. 2006, http://www.seyfarth.com/dir_docs/news_item/8e851cfc-548f-4e8d-9258-
a20fa0b6ed0c_documentupload.pdf. Many feel that unless the DOJ finds the “smoking
gun—evidence of a meeting or meetings of the head honchos of the top firms to slice up the
pie”—then there is not much to worry about. Allchorne, supra note 19, at 49. Certain authorities
feel that clubs have been engaging in suspect behavior for a long time. Id. As of March 2008 it is
uncertain whether the investigation is still ongoing. Arlene Jacobius, Club Deals See Silver Lining
in Federal Court Ruling, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, Mar. 17, 2008, at 24.
21. Antitrust laws are theoretically designed to protect consumers, so literature often focuses
on the effects on the ultimate consumer. See, e.g., Jacqueline Dowd, Note, Application of the
Antitrust Laws to Newspaper Distribution Systems: The Sherman Act Turned on Its Head, 38 U.
largest private equity firms seeking voluntary, general information about
club deals since January 2003.  Although seemingly straightforward, the18
inquiry presents many complex issues that cannot be easily resolved.19
Irrespective of the outcome, the private equity industry is paying
attention.  Private equity will likely need to change if it wishes to20
continue assembling mega-deals like the TXU deal.
This Note addresses the antitrust issues that clubbing raises and argues
that the antitrust laws should not restrict clubbing—absent some egregious
conduct—and that courts should apply rule of reason analysis rather than
per se rules to these sorts of antitrust claims. Part II provides a general
background of antitrust law and the various standards that courts apply to
private equity clubs. Part III explains private equity and fleshes out what
a club deal is and how it works. Part IV discusses antitrust law within the
context of joint ventures and sets out the varying standards that could
apply to private equity clubs. Part V applies the antitrust analysis to private
equity clubbing. Finally, Part VI concludes by suggesting ways to deal
with antitrust problems and by examining some of the underlying issues.21
4
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FLA. L. REV. 479 (1986) (addressing a prior version of law and arguing that the application of per
se rules to newspaper price ceilings fails to protect consumers). A shift from a consumer-oriented
focus to a shareholder-oriented focus may be required when looking at private equity clubs.
22. On one end of the spectrum, the principal goals of antitrust law are “[d]ispersing
economic power and stimulating access to free markets.” SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 16,
§ 1.02, at 3. The other end of the spectrum rejects “this politically-centered, distributive-goal
analysis . . . [and] conclude[s] that the main, if not the sole, purpose behind [antitrust law is] the
promotion of economic efficiency.” Id. at 4; see also Simon A. Rodell, Comment, Antitrust Law:
The Fall of the Morton Salt Rule in Secondary-Line Price Discrimination Cases, 58 FLA. L. REV.
967, 968 (2006) (noting that the primary goals of the “antitrust laws were to limit
inefficiencies . . . and protect consumers”).
23. SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 16, § 1.02, at 4.
24. Congress delegated to the courts broad authority to fill in the gaps. Id. at 6.
25. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. IV 2004).
26. SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 16, § 4.01, at 115.
27. Id.
28. Id.
II.  ANTITRUST LAW BACKGROUND
Antitrust law regulates competition and involves conflicting underlying
policies and difficult facts. Despite policy differences,  commentators22
agree that the antitrust laws were written primarily to encourage
competition.  Over the years, courts have used their discretionary power23
under § 1 of the Sherman Act to address antitrust issues, resulting in a rich
and changing jurisprudence.  Section 1 of the Sherman Act states: 24
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise,
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be
illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage
in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be
illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony . . . .25
Section 1 of the Act outlaws horizontal restraints that may affect trade
or commerce.  Horizontal restraints occur “[w]hen competitors enter into26
an agreement which interferes with interstate commerce . . . [such as] price
fixing, market divisions or concerted refusals to deal.”  The Act seeks to27
prevent restraints that restrict output, increase prices, or in some other way
exclude competition, but the Act has been applied differently depending
largely on policies employed by the courts.  The next section follows the28
development of the two standards that courts have used when applying the
Sherman Act: the rule of reason and the per se standard. The rule of reason
strikes a balance between procompetitive and anticompetitive behavior,
while the per se standard simply prohibits certain activities. The last
section explains how the Supreme Court has recently blended the
5
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29. 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
30. Id. at 16–17.
31. SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 16, § 4.04, at 124–25; see infra Part V.B. 
32. 171 U.S. 505 (1898).
33. Id. at 568.
34. 175 U.S. 211, 228–29 (1899). 
35. SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 16, § 4.04, at 124. 
36. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
37. SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 16, § 4.05, at 127.
38. Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 66.
39. See id. at 66–67.
40. See id.; SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 16, § 4.05, at 127 & n.75.
41. See Animesh Ballabh, Antitrust Law: An Overview, 88 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y
877, 885–88 (2006) (discussing the progression of antitrust law and the early concern over large
business trusts).
42. 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
standards to evaluate activities on a continuum rather than as falling
strictly within the rule of reason or per se standard.
A.  Development of Antitrust Standards
The first case that the Court decided under the Sherman Act, United
States v. E.C. Knight Co.,  narrowed the Act because the Court concluded29
that the defendant’s actions, mere manufacturing, did not fall within the
definition of interstate commerce.  This narrow interpretation of the30
Sherman Act would not last.
During the early stages of antitrust jurisprudence, the Court struggled
with indirect restraints and developed what would become known as the
ancillary restraints doctrine, which is still applied today.  In United States31
v. Joint-Traffic Ass’n,  the Court suggested that it would permit indirect32
restraints,  and formally announced this doctrine in Addyston Pipe & Steel33
Co. v. United States.  The doctrine essentially says that “all direct34
restraints are ipso facto unlawful, even when the outcome is unreasonable;
ancillary restraints which are unreasonable are unlawful; and ancillary
restraints that are reasonable are lawful.”  35
Standard Oil Co. v. United States  demonstrates the Court’s struggle36
with interpreting § 1 of the Sherman Act and the breadth of the statutory
language, as well as a change in the ancillary restraints doctrine.  In37
Standard Oil, the Court clarified that the rule of reason applied to both
direct and ancillary restraints.  The Court not only advanced the rule of38
reason, but also recognized a per se standard.  In applying the rule of39
reason, the Court assessed the reasonableness of the agreement, whether
ancillary or direct. However, certain types of agreements, such as price-
fixing agreements, were presumptively illegal naked restraints.40
Early cases under the Sherman Act focused on small business.  In41
United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n,  the Court worried that42
6
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43. Id. at 323–25.
44. 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
45. Id. at 237.
46. Id. at 238.
47. Id. at 240.
48. SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 16, § 4.02, at 116. 
49. 288 U.S. 344 (1933).
50. SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 16, § 4.05, at 128; see Appalachian Coals,
288 U.S. at 360–61.
51. 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
52. See id. at 396–97; SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 16, § 4.06, at 129.
53. SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 16, § 4.06, at 130.
54. 310 U.S. 150 (1940); see infra note 173.
55. Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 224 n.59.
56. SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 16, § 4.02, at 116. The Warren Court’s structuralist
approach “focused on the structure of markets, reasoning that normal market structures will yield
competitive environments, at least in the absence of explicit horizontal price fixing,” which led to
commodity price reductions might ruin small businesses; thus, the Court
condemned fixing railroad rates by a cartel of several railroads.  The43
Court focused again on small business in Chicago Board of Trade v.
United States,  where the Court demonstrated a desire to promote44
competitive equality and initially announced the rule of reason approach.
At issue was the legality of an agreement, by members of the Board of
Trade, that regulated after-hour grain prices.  The Court set forth a test to45
determine the legality of an agreement: whether the restraint was merely
regulatory, thus promoting competition, or whether it was imposed to
suppress and possibly destroy competition.  In applying this now-classic46
rule of reason test, the Chicago Board Court upheld the agreement because
the agreement improved, rather than destroyed, market conditions.  Both47
Trans-Missouri and Chicago Board reflect the Court’s concern for small
competitors unable to compete against larger, more efficient firms.  48
The Court continued expanding its interpretation of the Sherman Act
in Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States  by “advanc[ing] a rule of49
broad discretion in favor of courts weighing competitive market factors
before reaching antitrust conclusions.”  Yet the Court did not abandon the50
per se standard for egregious behavior like price fixing. In United States
v. Trenton Potteries Co.,  the Court developed the per se standard in more51
detail.  The Court indicated that an agreement would be per se unlawful52
only if it was effective but left open whether market power was
necessary.  In United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,  the Court53 54
answered this question, finding that market power was not a requirement
for a per se violation of the Sherman Act.55
In developing antitrust law, the Warren Court used a structuralist
approach to develop the per se standard and disregarded the rule of
reason.  The Court explained in Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United56
7
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per se analysis application. Id.; see United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333, 335–37
(1969) (focusing on market structure and finding that “[t]he limitation or reduction of price
competition brings the case within the ban [of § 1], for . . . interference with the setting of price by
free market forces is unlawful per se” (citation omitted)).
57. 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
58. Id. at 5.
59. See David A. Balto, The Rule of Reason: Tension in the Law of Joint Ventures, in 45TH
ANNUAL ADVANCED ANTITRUST SEMINAR: DISTRIBUTION AND MARKETING 181, 183, 188–89 (PLI
Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook Series No. 8497, 2006). For examples of joint ventures
perceived as cartel-type arrangements and struck down as per se illegal, see United States v. Topco
Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972); United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350, 357–58 (1967);
Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 598 (1951), overruled in part by
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
60. SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 16, § 4.06, at 117.
61. 438 U.S. 422 (1978).
62. See id. at 441–43.
63. SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 16, § 4.06, at 118.
64. Id.
65. 441 U.S. 1 (1979); see infra Part IV.B.
66. BMI, 441 U.S. at 13.
States  that the per se approach avoided conducting the complicated57
industry-specific analysis that the rule of reason required, “an inquiry so
often wholly fruitless when undertaken.”  During this time, the Warren58
Court would likely have found that groups acting in concert, like the firms
in the TXU deal, and the surrounding restraints that these groups created
were per se illegal.59
The Burger Court moved in, cast aside structural analysis, and focused
on economic efficiency.  In United States v. United States Gypsum Co.,60 61
the rule of reason analysis re-emerged.  The case clarified that the Court62
preferred to view antitrust cases with an affinity for economic efficiency.63
The Court now preferred to weigh competitive harm against economic
benefit, even when the conduct in question could directly affect prices, and
consequently often chose a market solution over an antitrust intervention.64
For example, in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System,
Inc. (BMI),  the Court rejected a per se analysis and instead examined the65
redeeming qualities of the challenged practice.  Up to this point in the66
jurisprudence, two differing schools of thought created two vastly different
categories. The rule of reason balancing test was distinct from the
bright-line per se standard. Yet having two completely separate categories
would soon be a thing of the past.
8
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67. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
68. Id. at 110 n.42.
69. 110 F.T.C. 549 (1988), available at 1988 WL 1025476.
70. Id. at 8–13 (Commission opinion). The FTC has jurisdiction and authority to enforce the
Sherman Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 21 (2000); 54A Am. Jur. 2d Monopolies and Restraints of Trade
§ 1234 (2008).
71. Mass. Bd. of Registration, 1988 WL 1025476, at 12.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 12–13.
75. Id. at 13.
76. Balto, supra note 59, at 190.
77. Mass. Bd. of Registration, 1988 WL 1025476, at 13 (Commission opinion).
78. See New England Motor Rate Bureau, Inc., 112 F.T.C. 200 (1989), available at 1989 WL
1126783, at 26–27 (Commission opinion); Detroit Auto Dealers Ass’n, 111 F.T.C. 417 (1989),
available at 1989 WL 1126784, at 20–21 (Commission opinion).
79. 526 U.S. 756 (1999).
80. Id. at 780. Although the California Dental Court found this analysis inappropriate
B.  A Blending of the Legal Standards
Historically, the Supreme Court tackled antitrust problems by applying
either the rule of reason or the per se standard, but in recent years the
Court has blurred the standards. The Court indicated in National
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Board of Regents of the University of
Oklahoma  that in some circumstances a full rule of reason analysis may67
not be necessary.  In 1988, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)68
articulated a new rule of reason. In In re Massachusetts Board of
Registration in Optometry,  the FTC extended recent Supreme Court69
jurisprudence on horizontal restraints and set forth a three-step analysis to
determine whether a restraint is unlawful.70
Under the new analysis, the FTC explained that courts should look first
at whether a restraint is inherently suspect.  A court must determine71
whether a procompetitive justification or a theory of competitive harm,
which would prove a defendant’s market power, needs to be presented to
win the case.  If the restraint is not inherently suspect, the traditional rule72
of reason applies. Courts must determine whether there is a plausible
efficiency justification for the practice. If no credible justification exists,
the practice is condemned.  If the justification is plausible, courts should73
examine whether the justification is valid.  If it is valid, the next step is74
a full-blown rule of reason analysis.  If not, the restraint is declared75
unlawful under the “quick-look” rule of reason,  and no further76
circumstantial inquiry is required.77
Several subsequent FTC decisions have employed this three-step
approach.  Further, in California Dental Ass’n v. FTC,  the Supreme78 79
Court affirmed the quick-look analysis and indicated that a spectrum of
analyses exists.  In stressing the flexibility of the rule of reason, the Court80
9
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because the anticompetitive effects were not obvious, the Court upheld the “quick look” analysis
and noted: “‘There is always something of a sliding scale in appraising reasonableness, but the
sliding scale formula deceptively suggests greater precision than we can hope
for . . . . Nevertheless, the quality of proof required should vary with the circumstances.’” Id.
(quoting 7 PHILLIP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1507, at 402 (1st ed. 1986)); see also Cont’l
Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 277 F.3d 499, 508–09 (4th Cir. 2002) (discussing the three
approaches and viewing them as a continuum depending on the suspiciousness or uniqueness of the
restraint).
81. Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 780–81.
82. The most recent decision by the FTC that applies the newer rule of reason analysis is In
re Polygram Holding, Inc. (Three Tenors), No. 9298, 2003 WL 21770765 (F.T.C. July 24, 2003).
Although the FTC stated that it had a per se finding, it examined the facts in some detail. See Balto,
supra note 59, at 199. This decision has been widely criticized partly because it would have made
more sense to determine whether the joint venture was itself legitimate and then determine whether
the restraints served a legitimate purpose. Id. Nonetheless, Three Tenors is a good demonstration
of the newer approach. Id. Despite criticism, the D.C. Circuit affirmed this decision on appeal.
Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 38–39 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
83. JOSH LERNER ET AL., VENTURE CAPITAL AND PRIVATE EQUITY 1 (3d ed. 2005). Initially,
private equity was an American phenomenon with its origins in small offices that managed the
wealth of well-to-do families. Id. Growth was slow through the 1970s mostly because of reluctance
from institutional investors. Id. at 2. In 1979, however, the Department of Labor clarified the
“prudent man” rule for the Employee Retirement Income Security Act and “explicitly allowed
pension managers to invest in high-risk assets, including private equity.” Id. Starting in the 1980s,
private equity did a lot of “leveraged buyouts,” id., which refer to acquiring other companies,
breaking them up, and selling them off. This was an interesting time for private equity because
funds packed some of the biggest high-tech companies, but commitments to the industry were
mixed, and boom and bust occurred due to concentrated investments in certain industries. Id. By the
1990s, the industry began to recover, seeing dramatic growth and excellent returns. Id. at 3.
84. Investor Words, supra note 13.
stated: “[T]here is generally no categorical line to be drawn between
restraints that give rise to an intuitively obvious inference of
anticompetitive effect and those that call for more detailed treatment. What
is required, rather, is . . . looking into the circumstances, details, and logic
of the restraint.”  Consequently, courts now approach horizontal-restraint81
problems by using a continuum rather than distinct categories, and the
analysis is factually intensive.82
III.  THE RISE OF PRIVATE EQUITY
A.  Defining Private Equity
Although private equity is increasingly important in both the American
and global economy, many people are unfamiliar with the industry.  The83
term private equity means any investment in an equity asset that does not
trade on a public stock exchange.  Private equity firms are traditionally84
structured as limited partnerships that invest in target companies and
10
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85. The most commonly used entity form for venture capital investing is the limited
partnership, but a recent trend uses the limited liability company (LLC). Mark J.P. Anson, Chapter
30: Private Equity, in THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT 815, 821–22
(Frank J. Fabozzi & Harry Markowitz eds., 2002). Both the limited partnership and the LLC
accomplish the goal of pooling capital to make investments, but the limited partnership is better for
raising funds from a large number of passive investors. Id. The LLC is preferable if the venture
capitalist prefers to work with a small number of knowledgeable investors, such as pension funds
and other institutional investors. Id. Categories of private equity investment include the leveraged
buyout, venture capital, growth capital, angel investing, mezzanine capital, distressed debt, and
others. Id. at 815. A leveraged buyout (LBO) is when a company acquires a target, or a large
interest in the target, by using a large amount of borrowed funds. Investor Words, Leveraged
Buyout Definition, http://www.investorwords.com/2787/Leveraged_Buyout.html (last visited May
13, 2008). The targets’ assets usually serve as collateral for the borrowed money. Id. Venture
capital provides a significant source of funding available for start-up firms or “small businesses
with exceptional growth potential.” Investor Words, Venture Capital Definition,
http://www.investorwords.com/5236/venture_capital.html (last visited May 13, 2008). An angel
investor provides capital in smaller, more personal arenas to start-up companies, and these
investments are typically characterized by high levels of risk and potentially high returns. Investor
Words, Angel Investor Definition, http://www.investorwords.com/212/angel_investor.html (last
visited May 13, 2008). Mezzanine financing is venture capital that is usually acquired during the
last stage of financing prior to an initial public offering (IPO). Investor Words, Mezzanine
Financing Definition, http://www.investorwords.com/3047/mezzanine_financing.html (last visited
May 13, 2008).
86. See Anson, supra note 85, at 816, 818–19. Private equity differs from other types of
investments because it fills in a gap and finances investments that pose risks and uncertainties that
would normally discourage others from investing. LERNER ET AL., supra note 83, at 4 (“The
financing of young and restructuring firms is a risky business.”).
87. See generally supra Part I (discussing KKR’s acquisition of TXU).
88. See LERNER ET AL., supra note 83, at 1. By the late 1990s, investment in private equity
reached record levels, and it outperformed just about every other financial product. Id. at 3. There
is concern that the industry will need to address potential overgrowth—the industry’s growth rate
may be too high to be sustainable. Arleen Jacobius, Jumbo Fund Returns May Be Large Cap in
Disguise, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, Dec. 11, 2006, at 3. Recent changes, such as “the
establishment of affiliate funds . . . and the expansion of the funds offered by buyout funds to
include real estate, mezzanine, and bond funds” have made the private equity market more
competitive. LERNER ET AL., supra note 83, at 3.
89. LERNER ET AL., supra note 83, at 8 n.6.
obtain funding from passive institutional investors.  Firms can usually85
control the management of the target companies they purchase and often
increase the value of the targets by bringing in new management.  KKR86
sought precisely this result by substituting new management at target
TXU.87
Between 1980 and 2004, private equity funds grew from $5 billion to
over $300 billion.  Despite this phenomenal growth, private equity still88
represents only $1 in the portfolio of U.S. institutional investors for every
$25 of publicly traded equities.  One attractive aspect of private equity is89
its ability to make bold investments aimed at boosting earnings that public
corporations cannot accomplish. John Altorelli of the law firm Reed Smith
11
Jackson: Much Ado About Nothing? The Antitrust Implications of Private Equ
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2008
708 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60
90. Jacobius, supra note 88 (quoting Altorelli).
91. Id.
92. KKR, TPG-Led Consortium to Acquire TXU, supra note 7.
93. See Interview by Steve Inskeep, Nat’l Public Radio with Fred Krupp, President, Envtl.
Def. Fund, (Feb. 27, 2007), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=76
15616.
94. There are an estimated 900 venture capital firms that raise money from individual and
institutional investors. The Private Equity Venture Capital Club, Private Equity and Venture Capital
Industry Snapshot, Sept. 13, 2004, at 2, http://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/students/organizations/pevc/
041112_PEVCIndustryInfo.pdf.
95. See supra Part I.
96. See Eric Schwartzman, What It Takes to Make a Consortium Work, INT’L FIN. L. REV.
(SUPP.: 2006 GUIDE TO PRIVATE EQUITY & VENTURE CAP.), Jan. 2006, at 99, 99, available at
http://www.iflr.com/?Page=17&ISS=21163&SID=605633.
97. Fortune, Private Equity Power List, http://money.cnn.com/galleries/2007/fortune/0702/
gallery.powerlist.fortune/index.html (last visited May 13, 2008).
98. Id.
99. This Note uses club deal and consortium deal interchangeably.
100. James Westra, Club Deals, in 37TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 261,
263 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook Series No. 6063, 2005). Eric Schwartzman
explains, “the main criterion that makes deals ripe for potential buyers to form consortiums: they
were all multibillion-dollar deals where no one private equity firm could have funded the entire
equity piece or would have been willing to take the risk of doing so even if it could have funded
LLP explains, “‘You can take hits to earnings in the short run for long-
term gains, such as shutting down plants.’”  But such strategies are90
troublesome for boards of public companies to explain to shareholders.91
The TXU deal provides a perfect example. The buyers plan to reorganize
the company to make TXU more innovative, environmentally friendly, and
consumer-centric.  While shutting down eight coal-fired power plants92
may be a great solution for TXU’s long-term value maximization, TXU
could suffer in the short-term.93
Though the private equity industry has a wide variety of participants,94
this Note focuses on the largest companies contacted by the DOJ in 2006
as part of an inquiry into the industry.  In the billion-dollar market95
segment, from 2001 to 2005 about sixty club deals occured involving U.S.
targets.  The top ten private equity firms have recently raised an estimated96
$136 billion.  These firms include: The Blackstone Group, KKR, The97
Carlyle Group, TPG, Bain Capital, Providence Equity Partners, Apollo
Advisors, Warburg Pincus, Cerberus, and Thomas H. Lee.98
B.  Why Join a Private Equity Club?
Key to private equity success has been the consortium, or club, deal.99
Firms cite many reasons for clubbing, but perhaps the principal ground has
been that clubbing allows firms to go after larger targets than each firm
could acquire individually.  Often, “no single fund has sufficient100
12
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the equity.” See Schwartzman, supra note 96, at 99. But see infra notes 276–77 and accompanying
text (discussing equity bridges).
101. Westra, supra note 100, at 263. Some suggest that these large targets are best suited to
private equity purchase because they “typically have a deeper, more experienced management
team, a more developed infrastructure, access to credit markets at lower rates, and, given the
market’s preference for larger IPO’s, better access to public equity markets” all of which point to
a potential for higher valuation gains over time. Id. at 263–64.
102. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Buyout of TXU Breaking Ground in Its Size and in Its
Innovative Financing, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2007, at C1.
103. Schwartzman, supra note 96, at 99; see also Westra, supra note 100, at 264 (“Governing
documents of private equity funds typically contain diversification requirements which limit the
percentage of the respective funds’ assets that may be invested in a single investment.”).
104. Westra, supra note 100, at 264; Schwartzman, supra note 96, at 99 (explaining that a
benefit of club deals is getting the chance to “share the burden and risk of writing a large equity
cheque”).
105. See Sorkin, supra note 102. The last $1 billion in cash comes from an “equity bridge.”
See infra note 109 and accompanying text.
106. Schwartzman, supra note 96, at 99.
107. Five out of the ten largest LBOs in 2005 were club deals. Mark B. Tresnowski & Annie
S. Terry, Private Equity Consortium Agreements, in MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 2006: WHAT
YOU NEED TO KNOW NOW 93, 95 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook Series No. 10160,
2006).
108. Sorkin, supra note 102.
109. Id. With the “equity bridge,” banks co-invest in equity with buyers. In the KKR–TPG
resources to write the entire equity check.”  In the TXU deal, KKR and101
TPG each plan to invest $2 billion in cash and the remaining four
participants each plan to invest $3 billion total from their private equity
divisions.  Without taking on excessive risk, any of these firms would102
have difficulty providing the resources on their own. 
In addition to not having the resources to compete on their own,
investment restrictions often prevent firms from investing too large a
percentage of their portfolios in one transaction because of the increased
risk.  Clubs provide a solution to this problem because they tend to103
disperse risk.  KKR and TPG certainly lowered risk by investing104
only $2 billion of the required $8 billion of cash needed for the deal.105
Moreover, clubs can help to bolster debt financing. Obtaining bank
loans or selling high-yield bonds becomes easier when firms can attach the
names of several well-known sponsors to their deals.  Debt often plays106
a large role in these transactions and can be pivotal to winning bids.  In107
the TXU deal, GS Capital Partners, Lehman Brothers, Citigroup, and
Morgan Stanley are providing $24 billion in new debt, and the buyer club
is assuming $13 billion in old debt.  This new debt likely would not be108
available but for the club arrangement. Interestingly, this deal has a novel
financing arrangement where JPMorgan Chase, Morgan Stanley, and
Citigroup are providing an additional $1 billion of cash in the form of an
equity bridge.  Providing the extra $1 billion was probably easier to109
13
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deal, banks lent KKR and TPG $1 billion of their own cash, which enables private equity firms to
come up with less cash. Id. Though these “equity bridges” are risky, they may provide an
alternative to clubbing or may make deals even more competitive because more funds will be able
to participate. Id.
110. KKR, TPG-Led Consortium to Acquire TXU, supra note 7.
111. Schwartzman, supra note 96, at 99.
112. Westra, supra note 100, at 264.
113. KKR, TPG-Led Consortium to Acquire TXU, supra note 7.
114. See, e.g., Woodrow W. Campbell, Jr. & Paul S. Bird, Private Equity: Current Topics, in
FIFTH ANNUAL PRIVATE EQUITY FORUM: LEGAL AND FINANCIAL STRATEGIES FOR DEALMAKING
IN A NEW REGULATORY REGIME 7, 65–66 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook Series No.
B0-01YU, 2003) (explaining the benefits of joining a club).
115. The auction process is not public, and it is difficult to tell what goes into a consortium
agreement. Slater, supra note 17.
116. Westra, supra note 100, at 263. “Clubs can be formed at any stage of the process—in the
early stage of the bidding, shortly before the deal is won, when it becomes more apparent which
funds remain interested at the winning price, and with increasing frequency, after the deal is won,
when the winning bidder seeks to lay off economic risk.” Id.
117. Schwartzman, supra note 96, at 100.
118. Id.
119. Id.
justify considering $4 billion has already been paid out by KKR and TPG,
who have also convinced four private equity firms to sign on.110
Finally, management expertise provides a good reason for clubbing.
Firms can “combine, enhance and supplement expertise, bringing the best
resources to bear for the benefit of the investment, portfolio company and
potential return.”  Risk diminishes if firms join with other firms having111
a particular expertise, such as familiarity with a particular sector.  In the112
TXU deal, Henry Kravis offers an experienced management team and an
ability to rally support from high-powered political figures to implement
the long-term plan.  Thus, good reasons exist for firms to consider113
joining the club.114
C.  Private Equity Club Agreements
Analyzing the mechanics of club deals is difficult because of the
tremendous variation in club structure and the lack of public information
about the deals.  The starting point for creating a club is drafting a club115
agreement—which can occur at any time during the transaction.  One116
commentator describes four different types of clubs based on timing: the
traditional marriage, the shotgun marriage, the late-life marriage, and the
arranged marriage.  117
A traditional marriage occurs when firms join together at the beginning
and work to submit and negotiate the bid together.  A shotgun marriage118
occurs when one firm has made significant progress and other firms join
before submitting the actual bid.  A late-life marriage occurs when a firm119
14
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120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. See id.
124. See, e.g., Terry Macalister, Private Equity Firms Pledge Green Power from £23bn U.S.
Deal, THE GUARDIAN (London), Feb. 27, 2007, at 25, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/
business/2007/feb/27/privateequity.energy.
125. Consortium agreements have been referred to as “Consortium Agreements,” “Inter-
Sponsor Agreements,” “Interim Investors Agreements” or unnamed letter agreements. Tresnowski
& Terry, supra note 107, at 95.
126. Id. at 96.
127. For a more detailed discussion, see Campbell & Bird, supra note 114, at 65–73.
128. Tresnowski & Terry, supra note 107, at 96.
129. Id. at 96–97.
130. Id. at 97.
seeks other firms to help with the equity commitment post-signing.120
Finally, an arranged marriage occurs when a seller determines which firms
should join together for a consortium deal.121
Depending on the arrangement, one firm may take the lead, or all the
firms may work together as equal partners.  The arrangement will affect122
how the firms deal with each other and negotiate agreements.  In the123
TXU deal it is difficult to tell if a clear leader exists. Some sources
indicate that KKR and TPG lead the deal together; so it might have been
either a traditional or shotgun marriage.124
Club agreements  should establish the rules of engagement among the125
firms.  When negotiating a club deal, participants should carefully126
consider the following: the exclusivity terms, bidding strategy, the role of
management, financing structure, allocation of expenses, governance
rights, board representation and committee membership, supermajority
voting rights and veto rights, anti-dilution protection, information and
observation rights, allocation of deal and management fees among club
members, exit strategy, anti-diversifying effect, control investing, cross-
ownership problems, management fees, and put and call rights.127
Although a club agreement raises many issues, this Note focuses on a few
of the most pertinent ones.
Pre-bid club agreements are ideal. Even absent an official written
agreement at the pre-bid stage, participants should at least discuss and
agree on terms such as exclusivity, expenses, confidentiality, and equity
commitment terms.  These terms require participants to bid exclusively128
through the club regardless of whether they subsequently drop out.129
Exclusivity commitments could potentially dampen competition by
preventing a “dropout” from subsequently offering a higher bid.130
Moreover, club agreements usually require firms to share transaction
costs. Trouble arises, however, when a bid is unsuccessful; thus, most
agreements provide for more restrictive expense-sharing rules in the event
15
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131. Id.
132. A normal break-up fee is what the seller pays the consortium if the seller breaks the deal
because the seller chose either to go in with another bidder or to bow out completely. Id. at 100.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 98.
135. Id.
136. Id. This helps clarify who is liable for a breach. Id.
137. Schwartzman, supra note 96, at 101.
138. Id.
139. FTC & DOJ, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS 2
(2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/04/ftcdojguidelines.pdf.
of failure.  Club agreements usually provide for a “normal break-up131
fee.”  Conversely, these agreements also provide for a “reverse break-up132
fee” to be assessed when the club fails “to close under the acquisition
agreement due to a breach or failure to obtain debt financing.”133
Typically, participants must sign confidentiality agreements with the
seller.  These agreements can potentially prohibit club formation or134
prohibit communication with potential club participants without the
consent of the seller.  The club agreement will generally require each135
participant to sign its own confidentiality agreement with the seller and
provide for a separate confidentiality agreement for the club as a whole.136
Lastly, in the event that the firms do not sign a club agreement at the
outset, clubs often have governing interim agreements.  If the firms137
subsequently sign an agreement, then they should review and renegotiate
key terms in the club agreement.138
Overall, club agreements lay out the rules and provide restrictions that
make it nearly impossible for an individual participant to compete outside
of the club. The public does not know the terms of the KKR and TPG club
agreement, but one can assume that these firms likely had an agreement
early on that addressed break-up fees, confidentiality requirements, and
management issues.
IV.  JOINT VENTURE TREATMENT UNDER ANTITRUST LAW
A.  Classification of Private Equity Clubs
In April 2000, the DOJ and the FTC published the Antitrust Guidelines
for Collaboration Among Competitors, which broadly defined competitor
collaborations as “one or more agreements, other than merger agreements,
between or among competitors to engage in economic activity, and the
economic activity resulting therefrom.”  Private equity clubs could easily139
be considered competitor collaborations because firms engage in the
purchasing of companies, an obvious economic activity. Thus, these
Guidelines likely apply to clubs such as the KKR–TPG club.
16
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140. Balto, supra note 59, at 186 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). A joint venture can also
be broadly described as something that “embraces any collaborative activity, short of a full merger,
by which independent economic actors pool their resources to pursue a legitimate business
objective.” William Kolasky & Elizabeth de Luca, Antitrust Treatment of Joint Ventures, in 47TH
ANNUAL ANTITRUST LAW INSTITUTE 179, 181 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook Series
No. 8736, 2006) (citing McElhinny v. Med. Protective Co., 549 F. Supp. 121, 131 n.7 (E.D. Ky.
1982)). Common types of joint ventures include joint purchasing agreements, where the parties
pool their purchasing activities to achieve efficiencies in their purchasing operations. Balto, supra
note 59, at 210. They can be structured as corporations, partnerships, or any other loosely based
associations. Id. at 186.
141. Balto, supra note 59, at 186. The most important factors evidencing joint activity are the
integration of resources and the spreading of risk. See, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa County Med.
Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 356–57 (1982) (finding no partnership or joint venture where the defendants
did not “pool their capital and share the risks of loss”); Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys.,
Inc. (BMI), 441 U.S. 1, 22–24 (1979); cf. Joseph F. Brodley, Joint Ventures and Antitrust Policy,
95 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1524–25 (1982). Brodley asserts that the above definition can be so broad
that it may be analytically useless; he suggests focusing on the factors that make joint ventures
distinctive, which are “the potential efficiency gains and anticompetitive risks of the joint
enterprise.” Id.
142. See Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 597–98 (1951) (opining
that simply characterizing an agreement as a joint venture will not save it from being considered
per se illegal where its only purpose is to eliminate the competition), overruled in part by
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
143. Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., A Proposed Antitrust Approach to Buyers’ Competitive Conduct,
56 HASTINGS L.J. 1121, 1151 (2005).
144. Balto, supra note 59, at 205.
145. 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
146. Id. at 354–56. “While it is not always clear when the degree of integration and risk
sharing is sufficient to justify rule of reason review, it is clear that the total absence of any risk
sharing or integration of resources by the participants will constitute grounds for speedy
condemnation of the arrangements.” Balto, supra note 59, at 206.
Moreover, government authorities would likely consider private equity
clubs to be joint ventures. A joint venture is “an enterprise formed by two
or more entities for the purpose of carrying out anything from a single
consortium bid to a permanent corporate enterprise.”  Joint ventures140
fulfill a variety of legitimate business purposes, such as exploiting
complementary skills, creating economies of scale, growing research and
development, and spreading risk.141
Some joint ventures can be classified as cartels.  In a cartel,142
“competitors enter into a naked agreement to fix prices without integrating
their operations in any manner.”  Crucially, private equity clubs must143
avoid cartel classification because this classification could lead to legal
action against the clubs. Factors that keep joint ventures out of the cartel
category include integrating resources and sharing risk.  For example, in144
Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society,  the absence of risk145
sharing led to a per se condemnation of the venture.  Cartels raise146
antitrust concerns because the level of cooperation does not go beyond
17
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147. Piraino, supra note 143, at 1151.
148. Balto, supra note 59, at 210. 
149. Id.
150. Id. at 183. A proponent of the law-and-economics school of thought, Judge Easterbrook
has observed: 
Joint ventures . . . require extensive cooperation, and all are assessed under a Rule
of Reason that focuses on market power and the ability of the cooperators to raise
price by restricting output. The war of all against all is not a good model of any
economy. Antitrust law is designed to ensure an appropriate blend of cooperation
and competition, not to require all economic actors to compete full tilt at every
moment. When cooperation contributes to productivity through integration of
efforts, the Rule of Reason is the norm.
Polk Bros. v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 776 F.2d 185, 188 (7th Cir. 1985).
151. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
152. See id. at 23–24. Congress has acted consistent with the case law, passing laws that
encourage joint ventures. For example, The Export Trading Company Act of 1982 was designed
to stimulate domestic firms jointly to strengthen their presence in foreign markets. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 4001(b) (2000).
153. BMI, 441 U.S. at 5–6.
154. Id. at 5.
simple price coordination, and there is no possibility of generating
economic efficiencies through the integration of resources.  In simpler147
terms, there is no good to offset the bad.
Joint ventures can also be classified as “purchasing joint ventures.”
Purchasing joint ventures include “arrangement[s] in which two or more
purchasers of a good or service agree to make such purchases jointly.”148
These arrangements range from bid-rigging cartels to efficiency-enhancing
arrangements that lower transaction costs.  Private equity clubs, such as149
the KKR–TPG club, would likely be considered purchasing joint ventures.
Thus, joint venture and purchasing joint venture case law informs the
analysis of such clubs.
B.  General Treatment of Joint Ventures
Recently, courts have viewed joint ventures more favorably by
recognizing that strategic alliances and joint ventures are integral parts of
the twenty-first-century economy.  Beginning with Broadcast Music, Inc.150
v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. (BMI),  the Supreme Court151
generally evaluated joint ventures under the rule of reason.  In BMI,152
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. challenged an agreement in which
more than 40,000 authors, composers, and publishing companies granted
nonexclusive rights to the American Society of Composers, Authors, and
Publishers (ASCAP) and BMI,  and a blanket license for their musical153
compositions.154
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155. Id. at 19–20.
156. Id. at 21–22.
157. Id. at 24–25. The Court remanded for a determination of the agreement’s validity
pursuant to the rule of reason. Id. at 24.
158. Id. at 19–20.
159. See Freeman v. San Diego Ass’n of Realtors, 322 F.3d 1133, 1146–48 (9th Cir. 2003)
(holding that the inherent cooperative aspects of a joint venture did not necessarily entitle the
venture to deferential review and finding that the joint venture fixed prices at an ultra-competitive
level without any legitimate justification—thus necessitating the per se analysis).
160. Addamax Corp. v. Open Software Found., Inc., 152 F.3d 48, 52 (1st Cir. 1998).
161. Engine Specialties, Inc. v. Bombardier Ltd., 605 F.2d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 1979) (“The talisman
of ‘joint venture’ cannot save an agreement otherwise inherently illegal.”). Indeed, the Competitor
Collaborations Guidelines state that “‘labeling an arrangement a ‘joint venture’ will not protect
what is merely a device to raise price or restrict output; the nature of the conduct, not its
designation, is determinative.’” Balto, supra note 59, at 185 (quoting FTC & DOJ, supra note 139,
§ 3.2, at 9).
162. See, e.g., Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 597–98 (1951),
overruled in part by Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984). 
163. 547 U.S. 1, 8 (2006).
164. Id. at 6.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 4.
The Court held that before condemning collaborative activity as per se
illegal, a court must assess whether a legitimate business justification
exists for the collaboration.  The Court found that the agreement had155
legitimate business justifications, which included substantial cost
reduction, less delay in using compositions, and increased flexibility;156
thus, the Court reversed the per se condemnation of the agreement.  The157
Court focused on whether the activity on its face appeared almost always
to restrict competition and to decrease output, or whether the activity
increased economic efficiency, thus rendering markets more, rather than
less, competitive.158
Although courts favor the rule of reason approach when dealing with
joint ventures, the per se approach still plays an important role.  If a joint159
venture is a complete sham, it can be considered per se illegal.  Simply160
labeling an agreement a joint venture will not automatically save it from
antitrust violations.  Courts and enforcement agencies examine the161
purpose and actual effect of the joint venture.  162
For example, in Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher,  the Court held that the per163
se analysis did not apply to a joint venture between two oil companies to
refine and sell gasoline in the western United States. While the single
entity’s price setting for their distinct brands constituted price fixing in a
“literal sense,” it was not price fixing “in the antitrust sense.”  In their164
joint venture, the companies pooled both their capital and their risk of
loss.  While the plaintiff’s failure to present a rule of reason analysis in165
the district court foreclosed relief on those grounds,  the Court held that166
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167. Id. at 7.
168. Id.
169. The Supreme Court continued the path established by BMI in National Collegiate Athletic
Ass’n v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85, 100–01 (1984), and in FTC
v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 458–59 (1986).
170. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
171. See SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 16, § 4.11, at 152–53.
172. 744 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1984).
173. Id. at 601. Another example of illegal price fixing comes out of United States v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co., which branded as illegal an arrangement among a group of large oil companies
involving the joint purchase of gasoline from refiners. 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940). The Supreme
Court rejected the defendants’ argument that the purchasing of gasoline was necessary to avoid
“ruinous competition” and found the practice to be per se illegal. Id. at 221. Notably, the only
integration was the agreement to buy, and there was no integration of resources. Balto, supra note
59, at 210–11; see also Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219,
221–22 (1948). In Mandeville, the Court struck down an agreement among sugar refiners to pay
a uniform price for sugar beets. Id. at 246. The Court found that “the agreement [was] the sort of
combination condemned by the [Sherman] Act, even though the price-fixing was by purchasers,
and the persons specifically injured . . . [were] sellers.” Id. at 235 (footnotes omitted). Here, there
was no price-fixing agreement among sellers, but the Court found illegal efforts to stabilize prices.
Id. at 235, 241; cf. Nat’l Macaroni Mfrs. Ass’n v. FTC, 345 F.2d 421, 421–27 (7th Cir. 1965)
(holding that an agreement among macaroni manufacturers that did not mention price but rather
limited the export of a product and required trade association members to use a set percentage of
the product in their macaroni had the purpose and effect of depressing price and was thus illegal).
174. ROGER D. BLAIR & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, MONOPSONY: ANTITRUST LAW AND
ECONOMICS 28 (1993).
175. Id.; see, e.g., Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 801–02 (1946) (holding
the allegations did not fit within the narrow parameters for per se
liability.  The Court also found that the ancillary restraints doctrine did167
not apply.  Thus, after BMI, most joint ventures should be evaluated168
under the rule of reason, but some would still be considered per se
illegal.  Treatment under a BMI-type analysis would benefit the169
KKR–TPG club.
C.  Treatment of Purchasing Joint Ventures
Purchasing joint ventures  can fall on either end of the antitrust170
continuum. Some courts have found purchasing joint ventures that engage
in price-fixing per se illegal, while other courts have upheld other
purchasing joint ventures that promote economic efficiency.171
Vogel v. American Society of Appraisers  provides a good example of172
per se illegal behavior with no efficiency-enhancing effects. In Vogel, the
Seventh Circuit found that buyer cartels are per se illegal when the cartel
forces suppliers to charge below-market prices to members of the cartel.173
Bid-rigging venture groups are also per se illegal.  Bid rigging occurs174
when would-be competitors determine in advance the winner of the right
to purchase.  Finally, buyer groups created for the purpose of using175
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illegal a conspiracy among three cigarette producers to eliminate competition in the purchase of
tobacco leaves by agreeing prior to the auction on the maximum high bid); Reid Bros. Logging Co.
v. Ketchikan Pulp Co., 699 F.2d 1292, 1297 (9th Cir. 1983) (finding agreements between two
logging companies illegal because the companies refused to bid against each other for timber even
during a shortage).
176. Monopsony power is when buyers combine to set prices or terms. SULLIVAN &
HARRISON, supra note 16, § 2.06, at 43.
177. BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 174, at 30.
178. 234 U.S. 600 (1914).
179. Id. at 606.
180. Id. at 608–09. In other words, the wholesalers could have ignored the threat but for the
monopsony power.
181. FTC & DOJ, supra note 139, § 3.31(a), at 14.
182. Mary L. Azcuenaga, Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors:
Federal Trade Commission, in 46TH ANNUAL ADVANCED ANTITRUST SEMINAR: DISTRIBUTION &
MARKETING 161,172–73 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook Series No. 11014, 2007).
183. Balto, supra note 59, at 203.
184. Azcuenaga, supra note 182, at 172–73.
185. The DOJ and the FTC favor agreements that are reasonably necessary—that is, there is
not another less restrictive way of achieving the efficiency-enhancing integration. Id. at 173.
186. SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 16, § 4.13, at 164–65.
187. 472 U.S. 284 (1985).
monopsony power  to eliminate competitors are also illegal.  In Eastern176 177
States Retail Lumber Dealers’ Ass’n v. United States,  lumber retailers178
circulated a list of wholesalers who competed at a retail level so that other
retailers would refuse to do business with those wholesalers.  Although179
the legitimate goal was protecting retailers from wholesaler interference,
the plan was premised on buying-side power.  Thus, courts in several180
instances have found purchasing joint ventures to be per se illegal.
Yet some purchasing joint ventures are procompetitive because they
enable “participants to centralize . . . functions more efficiently, or to
achieve other efficiencies.”  Purchasing joint ventures enhance efficiency181
when participants collaborate to perform business functions that benefit
consumers, such as by increasing output, lowering prices, or improving
quality and innovation.  Procompetitive efficiencies include “the creation182
of new products, scale economies, and risk sharing.”  To enhance183
efficiency, buyers typically combine capital, technology, or
complementary assets to achieve benefits that would be unachievable
absent the collaboration.184
If legitimate reasons  exist for buyers to have a purchasing agreement,185
then courts will analyze the agreement under the rule of reason.  In186
Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationary & Printing
Co.,  the Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s application of per se187
analysis and analyzed a joint purchasing cooperative under the rule of
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188. Id. at 298.
189. Id. at 286.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 287.
192. Id. at 295 (quoting Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. (BMI), 441 U.S. 1,
20 (1979)).
193. Id. at 296.
194. E. States Retail Lumber Dealers’ Ass’n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600, 612 (1914).
195. BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 174, at 28–29.
reason.  The cooperative in Northwest Wholesale comprised188
approximately one hundred office supply retailers acting as a wholesaler
to member retailers.  Members received rebates on purchases and the189
cooperative provided warehousing facilities.190
The cooperative denied membership to a plaintiff who changed its
policy and began dealing as a wholesaler as well as a retailer.  The Court191
found that the cooperative was “‘designed to increase economic efficiency
and render markets more, rather than less, competitive.’”  The Court192
suggested that the per se analysis applies only where the joint arrangement
unnaturally fostered “market power or exclusive access to an element
essential to effective competition.”  Per se analysis applies in these193
situations because the market would become less competitive.
V.  ANTITRUST ANALYSIS OF PRIVATE EQUITY CLUBS
This Part analyzes the KKR–TPG club under current antitrust law. To
gain favorable joint venture treatment rather than per se treatment, the
KKR–TPG club must show that it did not form solely to exercise
monopsony power or to rig bids, but rather that its purpose was to increase
economic efficiency and make the market more competitive, and that the
collaboration aided in that goal. Because the club likely falls closer to the
rule of reason on the continuum, this is where the analysis focuses. This
first section explores the various prongs of the rule of reason, and the
second section discusses the ancillary restraints doctrine.
When courts address antitrust issues, the underlying policy of
encouraging competition should be evident. Although this seems simple,
the analysis can be complex. Purchasing joint ventures, which include
private equity clubs, can fall at any point on the antitrust continuum. As
long as firms are not complete shams that exercise buyer-side power for
the sole purpose of excluding competition (as seen in Retail Lumber
Dealers),  or for bid rigging (as seen in American Tobacco),  courts are194 195
unlikely to find clubs per se illegal. 
If the club passes this “inherently suspect” hurdle, as articulated in
Massachusetts Board, then the court will (1) take a “quick look” at the
specific facts of the deal, (2) look for legitimate efficiency-enhancing
22
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196. In re Mass. Bd. of Registration in Optometry, 110 F.T.C. 549 (1988), available at 1988
WL 1025476, 12–13 (Commission opinion). In re Polygram Holding, Inc. (Three Tenors) indicates
that even if the court could stop after a “quick look,” it still might conduct a full rule of reason
analysis, especially considering the novelty of this issue. No. 9298, 2003 WL 21770765 (F.T.C.
July 24, 2003); see supra note 82.
197. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 691 (1978).
elements, and (3) determine if the efficiency justification is plausible. If
the justification is implausible, the analysis stops, and the club will be
considered illegal. But if the justification is plausible, the court may opt
for a more in-depth rule of reason analysis.  If the court continues to a196
full-blown rule of reason analysis, then the court will examine all relevant
facts to determine whether the challenged restraint “is one that promotes
competition or one that suppresses competition.”  Under this balancing197
approach, courts enjoy wide latitude in deciding the weight of each factor.
Alternatively, the court may turn to the ancillary restraints doctrine to
tackle the specific private equity club.
A private equity club, such as the KKR–TPG club, could be considered
inherently suspect. To support that conclusion, the DOJ could show that
KKR and TPG formed the club solely to avoid an auction, that the firms
could have obtained good financing terms regardless of the club, that club
members did not join to gain any expertise from other members, and that
the purchase price could have been higher. In short, the DOJ would need
to demonstrate that the KKR–TPG club’s sole purpose was to reduce
purchase price. The DOJ could also argue that the KKR–TPG club
exercised buyer-side power by reducing its financing fees, thus preventing
any other firm from competing. However, the deal could not happen
without the club participants acting together to obtain this financing.
Overall, the DOJ would likely struggle to prove a KKR–TPG club
conspiracy at the outset because of the difficulty of showing direct
evidence that the club was motivated purely to reduce the purchase price.
Because clubs will generally pass the inherently-suspect hurdle due to
a lack of blatantly egregious conduct, the court will likely at least perform
a quick-look analysis to determine whether the efficiency justifications
offered by the firms are plausible. Given the variety of justifications
offered, a court would likely perform an in-depth rule of reason analysis
and balance all the justifications with the adverse effects. This Part
addresses the many factors that a court would examine under a full-blown
rule of reason balancing analysis of the KKR–TPG club, as well as how a
court would scrutinize the KKR–TPG club under the ancillary restraints
doctrine. A rule of reason balancing analysis is the most appropriate test
for evaluating clubs because this method enables courts to take into
account the many positive aspects of clubbing.
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198. Market power for a buyer is “the ability profitably to depress the price paid for a product
below the competitive level for a significant period of time and thereby depress output.” FTC &
DOJ, supra note 139, § 3.3, at 11 n.30. For a discussion of market power, see Phillip Nelson,
Principal, Economists Inc., Presentation at the FTC and DOJ Public Hearings on Section 2 of the
Sherman Act: Single-Firm Conduct as Related to Competition: Monopoly Power, Market
Definition, and the Cellophane Fallacy (Mar. 7, 2007), http://www.ftc.gov/os/sectiontwohearings/
docs/0703PhilipNelsonpresentation.pdf.
199. FTC & DOJ, supra note 139, § 1.2, at 4.
200. Gen. Leaseways, Inc. v. Nat’l Truck Leasing Ass’n, 744 F.2d 588, 596 (7th Cir. 1984).
201. A perfect monopoly exists when only one producer has complete control of the market.
SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 16, § 2.03, at 21. An oligopoly exists when the market has only
a few interdependent producers, thereby reducing competition. Id. § 2.05, at 25.
202. Piraino, supra note 143, at 1125. Monopsony is the same concept, but when there is only
one firm. For examples of oligopsonies, see Oligopoly Watch, Oligopsonies,
http://www.oligopolywatch.com/stories/2003/04/17/oligopsonies.html (last visited May 13, 2008).
203. BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 174, at 47. The DOJ recognizes that “[t]he exercise of
market power by buyers has wealth transfer and resource misallocation effects analogous to those
associated with the exercise of market power by sellers.” 1984 Merger Guidelines, 49 Fed. Reg.
26,823, 26,827 (June 29, 1984).
204. BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 174, at 47.
205. Balto, supra note 59, at 201.
206. See, e.g., Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. (BMI), 441 U.S. 1, 5, 24–25
(holding that the practice of offering blanket licenses by organizations representing nearly 100%
of music composers and publishing houses was not a per se violation of the Sherman Act).
207. See SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 16, § 2.06, at 43–44. In the context of the DOJ
A.  Full-Blown Rule of Reason Analysis
1.  Market Power Factor
A club having too much market power  can tip the balance toward198
illegality.  Courts worry that a club with sufficient market power can199
restrain competition substantially.  Traditional literature discusses market200
power in the context of monopoly or oligopoly.  The flip side is201
oligopsony power, which exists “when a few firms, collectively
controlling a significant share of the market for the purchase of a particular
product, act in concert to reduce the price of that product.”  In202
monopsony and oligopsony cases, the concern is that clubs, such as the
KKR–TPG club, can exercise buying power and reduce prices below
competitive market levels.  Although no clear-cut formula exists for203
precisely measuring market power, the DOJ looks to market share as the
main indicator of buying power.  If market share is low, market power204
will likely be considered low.  However, large market share does not205
necessarily mean that a court will condemn a restraint.206
Defining the market is the first step in rule of reason balancing, and this
definition often dictates the result.  As expected, plaintiffs typically argue207
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inquiry, timing is key in defining the market. Slater, supra note 17. Before the auction, the market
is vast because of the capital available and the number of firms that are potentially able to bid. Id.
It is hard to imagine distorting competition prior to an auction by limiting the quality or number
of bids. Id. But once an auction has begun, the relevant competitors become limited, and the
antitrust analysis changes. Id. The DOJ would likely focus on this second period and look for
situations where firms start out competing head-to-head and then declare a truce and join forces.
Id.
208. BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 174, at 55. In general, the market is defined by looking
at the sellers and buyers whose supply and demand decisions determine the equilibrium market
price for goods or services.  Id. From a product market perspective, market power analysis requires
identifying geographic and product boundaries “that separate buyers and sellers whose actions
influence price from buyers and sellers whose actions do not influence price.” Id. In a product
situation, market definition is determined by finding what goods are generally substitutes for the
seller’s product. Id. The market is then narrowed by determining which locations can realistically
compete. Id. From the buyer’s perspective, in a products market, we look to competing uses for the
seller’s “output.” Id. at 55–56. If more “substitutable uses” exist, it is less likely that any one buyer
can force prices below a competitive level. Id. at 56. Because geographic limitations on the
definition concern whether sellers can ship to users, id., geographic limitations seem less relevant
for purposes of this Note.
209. SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 16, § 2.06, at 43.
210. See, e.g., Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 202 (2d Cir. 2001) (explaining that the
relevant market in a case where employees claimed that their employers had conspired to suppress
wages included any substitute buyers for the employees that could impact the ability of the
defendants to lower wages).
211. BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 174, at 48–49. In a pure monopsonistic situation, the
buying power index (BPI) can be defined as follows: “[T]o the extent that sellers can alter the
quantity offered for sale in response to price changes, monopsony (buying) power declines.” Id. at
49. The BPI for a dominant buyer (when there is not a pure monopsony) will depend on the overall
elasticity of supply and the elasticity of demand for the fringe as well as the dominant buyer’s
market share. Id. at 51. For a more detailed and technical explanation of BPI, see id. at 48–49.
212. Jonathan M. Jacobson & Gary J. Dorman, Joint Purchasing, Monopsony and Antitrust,
36 ANTITRUST BULL. 1, 37 (1991).
for narrow definitions to keep the defendant’s market share larger, and
defendants argue for broad definitions to keep their share smaller.  In the208
monopsonistic or oligopsonistic context, courts define the market by
asking “whether sellers could find alternative buyers for their goods or
services [i.e., companies] or whether prices might be forced so low by the
monopsonist [or oligopsonist] that new buyers would enter the market.”209
In short, the market definition depends on who can reasonably compete.210
After defining the market, the court must determine the market share.
Market share can normally be measured through the buying-power index
(BPI),  but for the sake of simplicity, this Note uses simple arithmetic211
fractions to determine each firm’s share. Under the DOJ analysis, a buyer
is not considered the dominant buyer until its market share reaches 35%,
the critical value.212
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213. SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 16, § 2.06, at 26.
214. See K.M.B. Warehouse Distribs., Inc. v. Walker Mfg. Co., 61 F.3d 123, 129 (2d Cir.
1995); Rebel Oil Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1434 (9th Cir. 1995).
215. The following is a list of the recent buyout fundraising ability of the top ten private equity
firms: The Blackstone Group ($23 billion); Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. ($21.6 billion); The
Carlyle Group ($18.3 billion); Texas Pacific Group ($15.2 billion); Bain Capital ($13 billion);
Providence Equity Partners ($11 billion); Apollo Advisors ($10.1 billion); Warburg Pincus ($9.2
billion); Cerberus ($8 billion); and Thomas H. Lee ($7 billion). Fortune, Private Equity Power List,
supra note 97. If the market is defined this way (all potential firms available to bid), then the
Blackstone Group has the largest market share with 16.8%.
216. See Slater, supra note 17; supra notes 209–10 and accompanying text.
217. See E. States Retail Lumber Dealers’ Ass’n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600, 606 (1914).
Alternatively, courts may measure market power by focusing on a
firm’s ability to change prices from a competitive level.  In this sense,213
the focus shifts to showing market power by evidence of specific conduct
indicating power to exclude competition or control prices, or by direct
evidence of injury caused by market power, rather than simply looking at
percentage of market share.  Under this approach, private equity clubs,214
such as the KKR–TPG club, have significant market power.
In the context of the TXU deal, the potential buyers of TXU define the
market. The market can be narrowly described as private equity firms that
can reasonably compete, and broadly described as both private equity
firms and public corporate strategic buyers. Broad or narrow, the market
should include all firms that would be interested in this type of deal and
that can realistically compete, whether or not they actually participate.
It is difficult to glean from public information those firms that would
or could bid. For simplicity’s sake, this Note looks at the firms that would
most likely be interested in such a deal—the top private equity firms.
Under either a broad or narrow definition of the market of all potential
bidders, no one private equity firm meets the 35% market threshold for the
DOJ.  However, shifting the time frame to look at the actual competitors215
after bidding begins narrows the market definition and raises the market
share, indicating more market power. The DOJ may shift the time frame,
which would be less favorable to private equity.  216
But market share is not necessarily the only indicator of market power.
Under the alternative approach, clubs may be able to change prices from
a competitive level, thus demonstrating tremendous market power. The
central question is whether the exercise of buying power eliminates the
competition, as was the case in Retail Lumber Dealers.  In the TXU deal,217
exercising market power may have led to lower financing costs. The lower
costs may indicate that because the KKR–TPG club was so powerful and
could obtain better financing, the other bidders simply could not compete.
Thus, market power may be proven regardless of market share. Yet,
26
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218. Andrea Orr, The Decline of the Club Deal, THEDEAL.COM, July 2, 2007, http://www.the
deal.com/dealscape/2007/07/the_decline_of_the_club_deal.php; see Jim Zarroli, All Things
Considered: Financing for Private Equity Deals Dries up, (Mar. 28, 2008),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyID=89194064 (discussing the credit crunch).
219. FTC & DOJ, supra note 139, § 1.1, at 2. Put simply, antitrust injury is “injury that results
from a loss of competition.” Jeffrey L. Harrison, Trademark Law and Status Signaling: Tattoos for
the Privileged, 59 FLA. L. REV. 195, 215 (2007).
220. Azcuenaga, supra note 182, at 170. Collaborations may limit decision-making or reduce
the ability to compete independently, facilitating explicit or tacit collusion, such as through the
exchange of sensitive information. Id.
221. David B. Caruso, Antitrust Suit Accuses Private Equity Firm of Bid Rigging in LBO
Transactions, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 15, 2006, available at http://www.whafh.com/modules/
press_release/?action=view&id=60.
222. Slater, supra note 17. Criminal cases are usually limited to situations where there is an
unjustifiable agreement on price (i.e., per se illegal agreements). Id. Thus, if it were looking at the
TXU deal, the DOJ would likely pursue a civil action. Id.
because the current market has had so much capital available, good
financing terms have been easily available to numerous organizations.218
Thus, obtaining good financing may not really reflect an exercise of
market power.
In sum, private equity clubs undoubtedly exercise market power, but
good arguments exist for whether or not clubs exercise excessive power.
But market power alone cannot result in liability. Clubs like the
KKR–TPG club make themselves more competitive by joining firms
together to obtain better financing and other benefits, thus increasing their
buyer power. However, these firms also arguably restrict competition
because they position themselves such that no one can bid effectively
against them, potentially resulting in too much power.
2.  Competitive Harm Factor
After establishing market power, the next key step is to identify the
harmed party and the extent of the injury. Anticompetitive harm refers to
an agreement’s adverse competitive consequences without taking into
account the procompetitive benefits.  Traditionally, collaborations raised219
concerns because they may harm competition and consumers by
“increasing the ability or incentive profitably to raise price above or reduce
output, quality, service, or innovation below what likely would prevail in
the absence of the relevant agreement.”  In the clubbing context, parties220
such as the TXU shareholders may be harmed by a lower selling price than
would be possible absent the “collusive agreement,” hurting both the
shareholder and, ultimately, the market.221
In criminal antitrust cases, the DOJ must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendants agreed not to compete.  In civil antitrust cases,222
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223. Id. It would be difficult after the TXU deal to restore the market to its pre-deal condition.
224. Id.
225. This is the tit-for-tat strategy where one firm gets one deal, then another gets the next,
and so on. Bradley C. Vaiana & Peter Nurnberg, Club Deals and DOJ Investigation Considerations
for Private Equity Investors, PRIVATE EQUITY NEWSL. (Nixon Peabody LLP), Winter 2007, at 1, 1,
available at http://www.nixonpeabody.com/linked_media/publications/PvtEqLBO_eIss1_Winter
07.pdf.
226. There may be information-sharing issues, but rivals are unlikely to share information
about the target company. Slater, supra note 17.
227. Bid jumping occurs when another party enters an auction after a deal has been negotiated.
Id. Bid jumping is rare in private equity, and some commentators justify bid jumping by pointing
to high break-up fees, which reduce incentives for equity bidders to jump ship. Id.
228. This Note does not address the private standing of shareholders. For information on
current private suits, see Caruso, supra note 16; Jacobius, supra note 20.
229. Private Equity: Clubby Capitalism, ECONOMIST, Apr. 2, 2005, at 31.
230. Vipal Monga, What Price Collusion?, DAILY DEAL, Oct. 23, 2006, available at 2006
WLNR 18294707. One private equity partner commented, “Collusion at 13 times cash flow? . . . At
those levels, you’d think the sellers would want to see more collusion.” Id.
231. KKR, TPG-Led Consortium to Acquire TXU, supra note 7.
232. For example, a firm in a club that would like to break away and offer a higher bid
sometimes cannot because of exclusivity agreements. See supra notes 131–33 and accompanying
text.
233. David Carey, PE Bid Collusion Hard to Prove, DAILY DEAL, Oct. 12, 2006, available
in which the remedy is typically injunctive relief,  the DOJ or a private223
plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendants agreed not to compete.  Under either standard, competitive224
harm may be difficult to prove. The DOJ may attempt to meet the standard
by offering proof that private equity firms split up the market through a
particular firm’s actions, such as declining to participate in certain
auctions,  sharing information,  and failing to raise bids.  In short, the225 226 227
DOJ would need to present fairly clear evidence that there was a real
possibility of achieving a higher selling price but for the club.228
Interestingly, some commentators argue that clubbing creates no
competitive harm because more money available means higher bid prices,
which drive down private equity returns.  Often “bidders [do] not get229
anything close to a discount on their purchases.”  In the TXU deal, the230
KKR–TPG club offered $69.25 in cash for each share of common stock,
which is 20% above the closing price on February 22, 2007, and represents
a 25% premium over the average twenty-day price ending on February 22,
the day the deal was announced.231
However, shareholders may suffer because big firms have figured out
how to dampen competition. Although shareholders receive above-market
prices for their shares, the shareholders still receive less than they could
potentially receive if not for certain club restraints.  In particular, big232
problems arise for private equity firms claiming that they paid top dollar
when deals occur without an auction, like the TXU and HCA deals.  In233
28
Florida Law Review, Vol. 60, Iss. 3 [2008], Art. 4
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol60/iss3/4
2008] THE ANTITRUST IM PLICATIONS OF PRIVATE EQUITY CLUB DEALS 725
at 2006 WLNR 17665468. For an interesting perspective on auction design, see generally Joseph
P. Cook, Auction Design and Collusion, ANTITRUST, Summer 2006, at 89, 89.
234. Carey, supra note 233.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Andrew Ross Sorkin, A $45 Billion Buyout Deal with Many Shades of Green, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 26, 2007, at A19. Because TXU had fifty days to review rival bids, a bidding war could
have developed. Interview with Fred Krupp, supra note 93.
238. David Cho, Blackstone Wins Buyout Fight for Equity Office As Vornado Exits, WASH.
POST, Feb. 8, 2007, at D01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/02/07/AR2007020700951.html?nav=rss_business/personalfinance. Note
that this was not a club deal, and Blackstone was forced to pay an additional $3 billion to close the
deal after bidding commenced. See Private Equity Power List: Top Ten Deals, supra note 5.
239. See BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 174, at 94.
240. Id. at 96.
the HCA deal, there were reports that Blackstone and others considered a
counter bid yet declined to make an offer.  Although collusive intent234
could be to blame, private equity offers another explanation.
Firms often limit their bids because of access to similar debt financing
packages.  Factors that do not bode well for clubs such as the KKR–TPG235
club include the presence of exclusivity agreements or break-up fees. If
these factors were present in the TXU deal, shareholders may have a
strong argument that the price could have been higher but for these
restraints because the restraints discourage members from exiting the club
and submitting counter bids. Regardless, in the HCA deal, even though
HCA did not get a counter bid, it still evaluated the KKR, Bain Capital,
and Merrill Lynch bids, and obtained a fairness opinion from two separate
banks.  In addition, the TXU merger agreement allowed TXU to solicit236
bids until April 16, which could have created a bidding war.237
Things look much more competitive in deals such as the Equity Office
buyout where Blackstone fought fiercely with Vornado Realty Trust to
acquire the target before Vornado finally gave up.  Thus, whether a238
higher price could have been obtained seems to be deal specific. Absent
an auction, shareholders cannot easily show that a higher price could have
been obtained, yet the lack of an auction does not provide conclusive
evidence that shareholders suffered harm.
3.  Economic-Efficiency-Enhancement Factor
Collaborations can provide benefits stemming from incorporating
different capabilities and resources to facilitate goals such as attaining
economies of scale beyond the reach of a single buyer.  In efficiency-239
enhancing buyer cooperatives, both buyers and seller gain; thus, antitrust
trouble is unlikely in such cooperatives.  Efficiencies render markets240
more, rather than less, competitive.
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241. See Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 356–57 (1982) (noting that
in the absence of a risk-sharing partnership or joint venture agreement, price fixing among
competing entrepreneurs was improper).
242. See KKR, TPG-Led Consortium to Acquire TXU, supra note 7.
243. Id.
244. Orr, supra note 218.
245. Dealwatch: PE Clubs, THEDEAL.COM, Mar. 9, 2007, http://www.thedeal.com/dealscape/
2007/03/dealwatch_pe_clubs.php.
246. KKR, TPG-Led Consortium to Acquire TXU, supra note 7.
247. Steve Rosenbush, Private Equity Slugfest, BUS. WK. ONLINE, Feb. 13, 2007,
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/content/feb2007/db20070212_956645.htm.
The TXU deal provides many efficiency-enhancing justifications.
Unlike the entities in Maricopa County,  KKR and TPG shared the risk241
of a $45 billion purchase of TXU.  KKR and TPG also likely received242
better financing by pooling their resources. Moreover, the KKR–TPG club
gained management expertise from KKR.  Thus, there are plausible243
justifications for KKR and TPG to form a club. However, more facts
would be required to answer determinatively whether these justifications
outweigh overabundant market power or shareholder harm resulting from
a lower purchase price.
Although better financing through clubbing may provide a plausible
justification for clubbing, recent market developments have weakened this
justification. As mentioned previously, the current market has offered
buyers a variety of financing solutions, and with the abundance of cheap
capital, firms may find themselves in a position where clubbing is
unnecessary.  In recent months, clubbing has declined slightly because244
firms have turned to investment banks, who act as behind-the-scenes
“shadow partners” to provide equity bridges that enable firms to provide
less up-front capital.  Thus, firms have been more and more capable of245
financing a deal on their own.
A better justification that is more difficult to refute is risk sharing. The
DOJ would likely struggle to persuade a court that only one firm in the
KKR–TPG club should bear the risk of a $45 billion deal. Moreover,
despite the availability of money, lenders may still want more than one
firm signed onto the deal to lower the risk.
Expertise is yet another justification that is hard to refute. In the TXU
deal, TPG can accomplish more of its goals by bringing in KKR and
Henry Kravis, who are influential and bring specific industry
knowledge.  This addition furthers the KKR–TPG club’s goals for246
turning TXU around—the whole reason for purchasing TXU in the first
place.
Interestingly, empirical evidence suggests that private equity markets
have become more competitive in the last two years.  Dealogic, a247
consulting company and online business news source, reported multiple
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248. Id.
249. Id. (quoting Robert Profusek, co-head of the mergers and acquisitions practice at the law
firm Jones Day).
250. See Zarroli, supra note 218.
251. See infra text accompanying note 278.
252. FTC & DOJ, supra note 139, § 1.1, at 2.
253. See supra text accompanying notes 230–31.
254. See supra text accompanying note 233.
bids for 29% of private equity buyouts in 2006. In early 2007, 70% of
buyouts had multiple bids.  One commentator has stated that “‘[t]here are248
many more competitive bids right now, and that is because so much more
money [has been] going around.’”  Thus, investment banks have—until249
the recent credit crunch —arguably been more inclined to lend to clubs250
because of risk spreading, and clubs like the KKR–TPG club have actually
made the market more competitive.
In sum, there are many plausible justifications for clubbing, some more
persuasive than others. With clubs, firms can achieve better financing,
share and reduce risk, and employ better management teams—all excellent
reasons to permit clubbing. However, with market changes, such as equity
bridges, some justifications may not look as persuasive as they did in the
past. From a larger economic perspective, when companies are in private
equity hands, firms can do things to achieve higher returns than could be
achieved in public markets, so encouraging privatization may be efficient
for the economy as a whole.  As mentioned previously, more aggressive251
management of companies, such as TXU, can create lasting value, which
can be realized when the companies are subsequently sold. Thus, there are
also arguably more benefits in permitting club takeovers than simply
increasing shareholder returns.
4.  Rule of Reason Balancing of the Factors
If a court performs a full-blown rule of reason analysis, after assessing
all of the factors, the court will need to balance the procompetitive benefits
against the anticompetitive harm to find the overall competitive effect.252
Analysis of deals such as the TXU deal could go either way, depending on
how a court weighs the factors. The courts could consider the following
factors: the club’s economic power and financing ability, the actual price
paid for TXU,  the lack of an auction,  the potential price that could253 254
have been paid if the DOJ can show that but for the club another firm
would have competed, the lack or presence of an exclusivity agreement,
KKR’s management and industry expertise, and risk sharing.
That no one else bid against the club for TXU does not bode well for
the KKR–TPG club. This lack of alternative bids possibly indicates that
the KKR–TPG club exercised market power that eliminated the
competition. Yet this is a deal of unprecedented size, and even if one firm
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255. Azcuenaga, supra note 182, at 172.
256. See supra Part II.B. For an illustration of the ancillary restraints doctrine, see Harry S.
Gerla, Competition on the Merits—A Sound Industrial Policy for Antitrust Law, 36 U. FLA. L. REV.
553, 567 (1984). Gerla’s article posits that if several firms enter into a joint venture to develop a
new product, then none of the firms have resources to develop it independently. The rule of reason
may apply even though competition might be dampened. If the firms sign an ancillary agreement
not to license the new process, the firms can claim that the restriction is necessary to entice the
other firms to participate in the venture. In short, the firms are demonstrating that there are no other
alternatives that will protect the members’ incentive to join the venture, and this would likely be
sufficient under the ancillary restraints doctrine. Id.
257. BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 174, at 100.
258. See supra text accompanying notes 151–58.
259. BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 174, at 101. Consider that if the procompetitive
efficiencies can be achieved without exerting monopsony power, the use of the monopsony buying
power should be eliminated because the potential benefits could be even greater without it. Id. at
98–99.
260. Piraino, supra note 143, at 1152.
could obtain the financing, the risk of such a deal would be tremendous.
Based on the little public information available, the TXU deal should
survive the rule of reason analysis if it is scrutinized because the positive
factors seem to far outweigh the negative ones.
In analyzing club deals, the DOJ will need to perform a fact-specific
analysis and determine how to balance the factors so that the result
promotes competition. The analysis is further complicated because club
deals vary tremendously, and a court may view clubbing in the aggregate
or may look at specific practices in specific deals. Banning specific
practices, such as engaging in exclusivity agreements or break-up fees,
rather than banning clubbing altogether, would be the best-case scenario
for firms if the DOJ decides to attack a club deal.
B.  Alternative Analysis: Ancillary Restraints Doctrine
Courts have found that a cooperative may be analyzed under the rule
of reason, even if the cooperative affects price, so long as the agreement
is reasonably necessary to achieve a procompetitive benefit.  Thus, even255
if an agreement affects price, an otherwise per se illegal collaboration may
still be analyzed under the rule of reason and the ancillary restraints
doctrine.  The ancillary restraints doctrine was conceived to circumvent256
the broad language of § 1 of the Sherman Act, so that every partnership
formation would not be considered illegal.  The doctrine is exemplified257
in the BMI case,  which held that an agreement involving actual price258
fixing should be evaluated under the rule of reason because the price fixing
was ancillary to a lawful joint-marketing arrangement.259
Under the ancillary restraints doctrine, courts should allow firms to
enter into agreements that are required to carry out legitimate venture
objectives.  The doctrine applies if “(1) the agreement is ultimately260
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262. KKR, TPG-Led Consortium to Acquire TXU, supra note 7.
263. See supra text accompanying note 238.
264. See supra Part III.B.
265. See supra text accompanying note 7.
procompetitive, (2) the anticompetitive agreement makes the
procompetitive results possible, and (3) the anticompetitive agreement is
no more restrictive than necessary.”261
First, clubs could argue that the clubbing agreement is procompetitive
because it enables more potential buyers to compete for the target
company even if there was the potential for a higher price but for a
restraint. In the TXU case, suppose that KKR would like to offer to buy
TXU. Three private equity firms, including TPG also wish to compete but
cannot due to lack of resources, high risk, or both. If these firms combine
forces, there are now one or two potential buyers for TXU, which
increases market competitiveness. This aspect of the doctrine, however,
would seem more persuasive in an auction situation. TXU would struggle
to argue that more buyers could have potentially competed because there
was only one bidder.  This argument is more persuasive in deals like the262
Equity Office deal, where there were multiple bidders.  For clubs to win263
on this point, the focus must be on potential competitors, not actual
competitors.
Second, the “anticompetitive” clubbing agreement must make the
procompetitive results possible. Private equity clubs arguably create a new
market, the mega-deal market. Many potential buyers could never afford
to purchase certain target companies without joining with other firms in a
club.  It is doubtful that many buyers could afford the financing or the264
risk of the $45-billion price required for the TXU deal; so there may never
have been even one bid but for the KKR–TPG club.  Again, however,265
clubs such as KKR–TPG may have a difficult time arguing this point
because of a lack of an auction.
Finally, clubs may argue that the agreement is no more restrictive than
necessary. They must show that clubbing presents the only way to achieve
the results: they could not buy without obtaining capital at a good rate and
spreading risk. Although it may be easier to obtain the capital in a liquid
market, the risk of one firm taking on a mega-deal is still tremendous.
Even a mammoth organization like KKR would have trouble with it. Yet,
with solutions such as equity bridges, it may be harder to argue that
clubbing is the least restrictive method. In sum, the ancillary restraints
doctrine may be an alternative way for clubs like the KKR–TPG club to
pass antitrust muster, but the arguments seem difficult when there is no
auction. The arguments become more persuasive if courts focus on who
could compete, rather than who does compete.
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266. Grace Wong, Private Equity’s PR problem, CNNMONEY.COM, Feb. 6, 2007,
http://money.cnn.com/2007/02/06/markets/pe_image/index.htm?postversion=2007020614. In late
2007, the credit crunch began to affect the private equity industry and financing has become more
difficult to obtain. See, e.g., Zarroli, supra note 218.
267. Wong, supra note 266. But see Slater, supra note 17 (arguing that the inquiry is really
about irritated sellers because the DOJ is not engaging in the inquiry for window dressing and
[Morgenstern] cannot imagine the DOJ officials saying: “‘Gee, people are making a lot of money
in private equity, so we need to make a splash in The New York Times about investigating them’”
(formatting added) (quoting Saul Morgenstern, an antitrust litigator at the law firm Kaye Scholer
LLP)).
268. John Gapper, The Case for Barbarity in Private Equity, FIN. TIMES (London), Oct. 16,
2006, at 19.
269. Brent Shearer, Leading the M&A Pack: Private Equity’s Part Is in Full Swing . . . But
for How Much Longer?, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS, Nov. 2006, at 28, 30.
270. See supra Part V.A.2.
271. Interestingly, the United Kingdom views club deals differently. The Financial Services
Authority does not find club deals to be anticompetitive because shareholders are not obligated to
accept the bids that are offered and clubs offer many procompetitive justifications for clubbing.
Regardless, a bad decision by the DOJ could create a ripple effect in the private equity community.
Vaiana & Nurnberg, supra note 225, at 1.
272. Wong, supra note 266. The United Kingdom already has a lobbying group known as the
British Private Equity and Venture Capitalist Association (BVCA). See BVCA Homepage,
http://www.bvca.co.uk/ (last visited May 13, 2008).
VI.  CONCLUSION
It is no surprise that private equity has been in the media as of late.
Until recently, debt markets were increasingly favorable, allowing private
equity firms to raise over $200 billion in 2006 alone.  Given the volume266
of money changing hands, some feel it is not surprising that firms like
KKR have attracted the attention of regulators and shareholders alike.267
Yet the private equity public-relations problem is nothing new.268
Some say the industry has outgrown the name private equity—Steve
Pagliuca of Bain Capital prefers the term “alternative capital markets.”269
Perhaps because of this growth, private equity markets should move
toward transparency. Although it would be difficult for the DOJ to prove
anticompetitive behavior,  the recent inquiry should serve as a signal to270
private equity firms, such as KKR, to make changes.  In an effort to be271
more transparent, some of the largest firms have formed the Private Equity
Council, which purports to lobby policymakers and help increase public
understanding of the industry.  Increased transparency will bolster trust272
and confidence in the industry, and will help private equity continue to
grow.
Many consider the American public markets a secure place to invest
because of the regulations imposed on the markets, but there is something
to be said for investment opportunities that can bring a higher return
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to invest in this exclusive company. Adam Lashinsky, Blackstone’s IPO, Thick with Irony,
CNNMONEY.COM, Mar. 22, 2007, http://money.cnn.com/2007/03/22/magazines/fortune/plugged
in_lashinsky_blackstone.fortune/index.htm; see also David Weidner, Blackstone Tacks on 13%
Gain in Debut, MARKETWATCH.COM, June 22, 2007, http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/
blackstones-ipo-opens-3645-share/story.aspx?guid=%7BEA17B8B5-6ED8-46A4-AAAF-
7764615DFD09%7D.
274. Two commentators suggest the following guidelines for private equity funds to follow:
(1) clubs should demonstrate legitimate business purposes, (2) clubs should adopt internal controls
to limit or prohibit information sharing,(3) a fund should take heed in switching to a winning club
if its club has lost an auction, (4) clubs should be formed as early as possible if funds know they
cannot win on their own, (5) funds should try to find other ways to win without teaming up with
the competition. Vaiana & Nurnberg, supra note 225, at 2.
275. Schwartzman, supra note 96, at 101. Because clubs involve sharing opportunities,
members must agree on issues like corporate governance and exit strategies, among other details.
Agreeing on terms can be difficult, as evidenced by the SunGard deal, which almost fell apart at
the last minute because the seven group members had trouble agreeing on price. Andrew Ross
Sorkin, Do Too Many Cooks Spoil the Takeover Deal?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2005, at 34. Recent
literature suggests that clubs may not be as appealing as they first seem. Id. Institutional investors
that pay hefty fees expect a large return. Id. As private equity funds engage in more and more club
dealing, they lose their differentiation and offer little more than a big bank account. Id. Finding a
hidden return in a $10 billion company is harder than looking to other types of investments. Id.
because of the ability to do things that public markets restrict, such as
taking short-term profit hits and making significant strategic decisions
without the cumbersome shareholder approval process. If firms like KKR
and TPG want to continue flourishing, they need to gain public
confidence.  Perhaps implementing industry deal standards could provide273
a solution.  The Private Equity Council should implement some of the274
best practices and require these practices in future deals like the TXU deal
so that the public is more aware and confident about the private equity
market.
Several good practices would help lower the suspicion of collusive
activities. Written consortium agreements executed at the outset, instead
of oral agreements, will ensure that everyone is playing by the rules.
Within the agreements, clubs should clearly spell out the reasons for club
formation. Clubs should also make clear how sensitive information is to
be handled and make sure to openly discuss issues with the seller.
Moreover, private equity firms like KKR and TPG might want to consider
alternatives to clubbing. Though clubs have become popular for a variety
of reasons, the relationships among club participants have yet to be tested,
and good reasons exists for avoiding becoming a “member of the club.”275
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278. Roane, supra note 12, at 50, 54. The compensation scheme for collecting fees seemed
to work well when the industry was smaller, but as the industry grows, the scheme seems like
overcharging especially when the fund invests in rudimentary debt instruments. Shearer, supra note
269, at 32.
279. Roane, supra note 12, at 52.
280. Kevin M. Schmidt, Private Equity: Current M&A Topics, in SEVENTH ANNUAL PRIVATE
EQUITY FORUM 41, 76–78 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Series No. 8449, 2006).
281. The ACG/Thomson Mid-Year 2006 DealMaker’s Survey shows high confidence in M&A
and ranks geographic regions with the greatest potential for private equity investments as follows:
United States (44%), China (18%), India (9%), Western Europe (7%), and Eastern Europe (7%).
ACG/Thomson Mid-Year 2006 DealMaker’s Survey, June 20, 2006, http://www.rcbg.com/news/
ACG_Thomson_DealMakers_2006_Survey.pdf. Although emerging markets present opportunities,
there are numerous challenges involved in these high-risk investments—private equity firms must
adapt to be successful. For a discussion of private equity’s role in developing markets, see ROBERT
E. LITAN ET AL., THE FUTURE OF DOMESTIC CAPITAL MARKETS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 457–68
(2003).
282. Schmidt, supra note 280, at 82.
For example, equity bridges  may provide adequate financing, allowing276
firms to bid on their own, which may make for smoother deals.277
Although private equity is succeeding domestically, investment in
foreign markets may be important to the continued success of firms like
KKR and TPG. Until now, the best firms have earned returns as high as
25% a year, but these results may not be sustainable as debt markets
tighten up.  Legitimizing private equity at home will facilitate worldwide278
opportunities. Currently, the reputation of private equity abroad is not
ideal. In Germany, firms have been called “locusts,” and in South Korea
they are called “moktui,” which means “eat and run.”  Perhaps positive279
domestic changes will improve the worldwide perception of the industry.
Private equity is still small by global standards, and there is room to
grow.  280
Emerging markets that afford opportunities include parts of Europe,
Asia, and India.  Literature suggests that there is plentiful capital281
available for investment in Asia because “[t]he risk–reward calculus is
such that the high growth, increasingly affluent, large economies of Asia,
and the increasing number of attractive investment opportunities within
those economies, outweigh the perceived risks and challenges of running
an Asian buyout business.”  By creating a more transparent industry with282
better standards, private equity could position itself to grow on a
worldwide scale and to continue to bring in high returns. Whatever the
outcome, the DOJ probe might actually spur changes for the better.
Private equity has become an integral part of our economy and has
achieved tremendous growth in the last several years. But setbacks often
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283. See Pa. Ave. Funds v. Borey, No. C06-1737RAJ, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13398, at *3–5,
*22 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 21, 2008).
284. Id. at *15.
285. Id. at *19.
286. Id.
287. For further discussion of the case, see Petter Lattman, Club Deal Gets Judge’s Boost,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 25, 2008, at C3.
accompany growth, and this industry now faces calls to adapt to its ever-
increasing size. If the DOJ attacks private equity clubs like the KKR–TPG
club, the DOJ would be unlikely to succeed. Under the rule of reason,
there are many positive factors that clubs can offer to counter-balance any
negatives that come with clubbing, and many elements can be hard for
plaintiffs to prove.
A case in February 2008 offers an example of the difficulties of
proving an antitrust claim against a club. In that case, a district court in the
Western District of Washington granted a motion to dismiss a claim
against two funds that allegedly conspired to join bids to acquire a publicly
traded company.  The court concluded that per se analysis did not283
apply  and found that the allegations could not stand under the rule of284
reason.  Key to the analysis was a broad definition of the market, in285
which the court found that the funds did not have sufficient power over the
seller.  Although the decision may be appealed, it is a victory for private286
equity funds.  In the future, there may be more cases like this. The DOJ287
inquiry may be much ado about nothing, but it certainly raises some valid
concerns and has spurred firms to take positive actions.
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